Boat Strikes Raise Sharp Questions About Military Lawyers’ Professional Duties

The following article was originally published in Just Security by one of our veteran partners. You can read the original here.

The recent lethal boat strikes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific have drawn intense scrutiny—not only for the operation itself, but for the opaque legal framework behind it. A key legal opinion by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) allegedly authorizing the strikes remains classified, despite the fact that similar OLC analyses for Syria and Libya were released publicly. Experts predict the document will eventually surface through voluntary release, congressional pressure, or Freedom of Information Act litigation.

Amid reporting that some military attorneys questioned the legality of the strikes, new concerns are emerging about whether judge advocates were pressured to limit their analysis or avoid evaluating core issues of lawfulness. The Washington Post reported that lawyers who raised objections were removed from their posts, while an anonymous administration official claimed there was no dissent within the Pentagon or within a restricted interagency legal panel.

Military law specialists say the episode highlights a deeper issue: the fragmented and inconsistent professional responsibility rules governing military lawyers across the services. Each branch has its own rules of professional conduct, and they differ in important respects. Scholars suggest this may be the moment to consider a unified set of standards or an overhaul of existing guidance, such as the Army’s Professional Responsibility Deskbook, last updated before the Army’s March 2025 rules revision.

Independent Advice—and Its Limits

By statute, judge advocates must provide “independent legal advice” to commanders, including candid assessments of legal, moral, and practical consequences. Some services explicitly require lawyers to address the “moral” dimensions of proposed actions; others do not. The rules also bar attorneys from assisting criminal activity—raising difficult questions when a lawyer personally believes a mission is unlawful but higher authority has reached a contrary conclusion.

Attorneys may withdraw from a matter if they “reasonably believe” their services would support criminal conduct or if they fundamentally disagree with the action. But military lawyers cannot simply walk away: Army rules require continued representation if ordered by competent authority, though lawyers may seek higher review or even separation from service.

Silence Is Not an Option

If lawyers were told to avoid examining the strikes’ jus ad bellum legality or were denied access to the OLC opinion, the rules still allow—and may require—them to press for the underlying legal rationale. Service regulations encourage “good‑faith efforts” to clarify legal uncertainty and permit requests to review higher‑level analyses. Ethicists warn that staying silent in the face of dubious legal reasoning can later be interpreted as endorsement.

Subordinate lawyers are also not shielded by orders from above. Under Rule 5.2, they remain responsible for their own professional conduct unless they follow a supervisor’s reasonable written resolution of a genuinely arguable issue.

A Need for Transparency and Review

Experts say that as more facts emerge, the legal profession within the military will need to examine how professional responsibility rules functioned during the strikes. Were they an obstacle to sound legal advice—or a framework that lawyers were not permitted to fully exercise?

Army rules allow attorneys to seek formal ethics opinions from a Professional Conduct Council, whose written decisions must be made public. Such mechanisms, specialists argue, are critical for maintaining accountability, training future judge advocates, and ensuring that military operations remain lawful, ethical, and worthy of public trust.

In the end, they warn, no military lawyer with serious concerns about a mission’s legality can simply remain silent. The integrity of the profession—and the legitimacy of operations—depends on it.